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Abstract  
Energy security, particularly liquid fuels, is a vital economic goal for both developed and 
developing nations.As a region, SADC has large coal, oil and gas reserves,and land for 
potential crop production for biofuels, yet access to liquid fuels is still a major constraint 
to economic and social development. Some coal is utilised in the region for petro-
chemical industries, power generation, and for heating. Crude oil reserves are largely 
exported due to the lack of refineries and pipelines in the region. Whilst biofuels 
production is in its infancy. This paper explores the challenges and opportunitiesthe 
SADC region faces in developing refining capacity and in investing in new CTL/GTL 
facilities as well as liquid fuels from renewable energy resources. A primary focus will be 
on Malawi and her neighbouring states, as a case study.  
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1. Introduction 
Energy security is a vital economic goal for both developed and developing nations. 
Technological advancements have allowed for new methods of production such as the 
conversion of coal and gas to liquid fuels and biofuels to ameliorate crudeoil price 
volatility, global warming concerns (in the case of biofuels) andcrude oil scarcity.Despite 
SADC’s abundance in crude oil reserves it is logistically more affordable to procure 
liquid fuels from gulf countries (India) due to the lack of intra-regional infrastructure in 
SADC(SADC, 2012; Golinska&Kawa, 2015). 
The huge surges in oil prices from 2008-2010 that stabilised at about $100 in 2014 
fuelled oil scarcity and peak oil debates. High oil prices were detrimental to economic 
growth of non-oil producing countries but fuelled the investment of alternative non-
conventional oil projects for petroleum productsthat were previously not viable due to 
low crude oil prices (Golinska& Kawa, 2015). The falling oil price of the period (2015-16) 
has had detrimental impacts to these investments and some companies have gone 
bankrupt as a result, as these projects are bound by a price floor of about $65-90 a 
barrel (Brammer& Reuter, 2009).The volatility of the crude oil prices have therefore  
influenced nations both developing and developed to develop strategic infrastructure 
and national strategies to secure energy security in terms of liquid fuelsand 
technologies for producing liquid fuels and biofuels. In addition the pressures of climate 
change have driven the development of biofuels. 
Malawi post-independence, as most newly independent African states inherited a 
legacy of low education levels and limited infrastructure. There was a general 
consensusamongst the liberation leaders that they would have to adopt big-push 
economic models to build infrastructure and to increase the literacy bases (Mkandawire, 
2010). This view was accompanied by large investments in roads, rail, education, health 
and energy infrastructureto aid critical sectors of these newly democratic 
states.However, many of these investments did not escape the industrial demise that 
the Washington consensus brought about from the 1980s (Fine, 2006;Mkandawire, 
2010; Amsden, 2007).The remnants of this are not hard to see. The closure of the of the 
TIPEIR Petroleum Refinery in Tanzania in 1991, the neglecting of the Malawian storage 
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facilities for petroleum fuels,the running down of rail networks and institutions of higher 
learning and the privatisation of state utilities are examples of the consequences of the 
adoption of pro-neoliberal policies (Fine, 2006; Kalinga, 2011). Despite the fact that the 
aforementioned state facilities and infrastructure once functioned, it seems impossible 
to the younger generation that lived through the BakiliMuluzi regime from (1994-2004). 
However,theseremnants provide a critical base of skills and infrastructural capacity from 
which industrial capacity could be built in order to achieve regional energy sector goals.  
This paper aims to explore and analyse the viability of the alternative sources of liquid 
fuels that are available to Malawi and other developing nations in the SADC region. It 
aims to analyse and outline the socio-economic opportunities and challenges thatRMCs 
have in the upgrading of current infrastructure for transporting and refining crude oil; in 
developing CTL/GTL technologies and in developing the biofuels sector. 
Secondary data includingreports, feasibility studies, academic literature, maps, raw data 
and graphs as well as insights from interviews were used and analysed for research 
purposes. Firstly, an overview of the current energy sources is attempted including the 
development of the historical and current infrastructure for transporting/storing and 
refining liquid fuels, CTL/GTLtechnologies, biofuels and potential oil in Lake Malawi, in 
order to introduce some of the historical, and socio-economic challengessurrounding 
these resources.   
The main of the paper covers three areas, namely, the development of historical and 
current infrastructure for transporting and refining crude oil, CTL/GTL technologies and 
the development of the biofuel industry. Part of the SADC region will be used as a case 
study with the Republic of Malawi as the primary focus to aid a discussion on the socio-
economic impacts and debates, political lobby groups and the case for economic 
integration. Policy recommendations and concluding thoughts are then given.   
2. The current world market for oil: Production versus consumption in SADC 
Oil and gas are hydrocarbon fossil fuels that occur as accumulations trapped in 
geological structures in permeable reservoir rocks beneath the earth’s surface.Oil is the 
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second most abundant liquid on earth after water (Hart, 2012). This relativeabundance, 
coupled with the falling oil prices of 2015-16,have largelynullified peak oil debates, as it 
is now apparent that there are considerable reserves and resources of crude(Hart, 
2012) and unconventional crude (tar sands and oil shales). There is a growing demand 
for petroleum becauseas nations develop, their liquid fuels energy needs increase. This 
increase is attributable to transport sectors, mining activities and other industrial 
activities. Therefore,as nations industrialise a significant national goal is to secure the 
expertise and the technological capabilities   that are utilised in the production of 
petroleum products (Khan, 2009; Tonurist, 2015). 
This explains the formation of national oil companies in various countries. The Chinese 
national oil company, the Russian oil company and the Venezuelan oil company are 
examples of state oil companies (SOCs) that have been developed to achieve national 
goals such as energy security.  State owned oil companies have been successful even 
under competition from private companies (Mfosi, 2011). Countries that do not have an 
SOC should consider developing this capacity as it is critical for nations to take control 
of mineral resources in order to build the necessary infrastructure and institutional 
structures that are needed to deal with liquid fuels energy insecurity.  
The formation of SOCsoften involves the nationalisation of oil facilities. There is 
however an underlying resistance and distaste for pro-nationalisation theorists in 
orthodox economics that isendorsed by the economic think tanks such as the World 
Bank, IMF and American and European policy makers(Mfosi, 2011; Fine, 2006). 
Bilateral trade and investmentagreements between SADC countries and the European 
Union therefore unsurprisingly prohibit the nationalisation of private companies. 
Experiences from the East Asian tigers suggest that departing from the western policy 
paradigm in some key sectors and policy spaces does produce favourable economic 
outcomes if implemented in the structure and environment of a developmental state 
(Amsden, 2007; Chang, 2003; Takala, 2014).   
Sub-Saharan Africa’s abundance in natural resources has generally been the curse of 
the region(Mehlum, Moene&Torvik, 2006). Discoveries in natural resources have been 
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characterised by long periods of colonisation, dehumanisation and conflict not too 
different from the experience of the oil discoveries in the Middle East. Both are 
experiences that have been well documented. 
Figure1 illustrates the distribution of world oil production. It is particularly concentrated 
in the USA, Russia and the Middle East; followed by the Far East and the North and 
South Americas. Africa has oil production in the north in Algeria and Libya, in the west 
in Nigeria, in thesouthern central region in Angola and in the east in North and South 
Sudan (BGR, n.d.).Hardly any of these countrieshas not had conflict therefore, resource 
curse theorists have substantial empirical evidence to back up their claims (Mehlum et 
al, 2006). Despite this reality there is growing demand for liquid fuels in sub-Saharan 
Africa, a region that has high energy insecurity issues.  
 
FIGURE1: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, RESERVES AND RESOURCES, 
2013 
Source: BGR, (n.d.) 
SADC is a region that should not have energy security issues, particularly liquid fuels. It 
is a region that has high unexploited renewable liquid fuels energy resources, 
conventional resources such as oil (SADC, 2009) and unconventional resources such 
as coal, gas/shalegas and coal bed methane (CBM). However, most of these oil and 
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gas resources are largely unavailable to the region due to foreign obligations and limited 
infrastructure for producing and transporting liquid fuels in the region (using both 
conventional and unconventional production methods) (Yates, 2009). Industrial 
development and expansion of the middle class in the region are the primary drivers of 
the increased demand for petroleum fuels such as diesel, petrol/gasoline, jet fuels and 
heating fuels. 
From 1980 to 2013, Angola has significantly increased its oil production from less than 
200 000 barrels to approximately 2000 000 barrels of oil a day (Soque, 2013). South 
Africa, due to the economic gains of SASOL, has increased its production of 
synfuelsfrom 0in 1950 to 166 000 barrels a dayin 2012(Radebe, 2012). South Africa’s 
increased production is due to investments into CTL/GTL technologies. CTL/GTL 
technologies were utilised in Germany during world WWII(Sparks, n.d.).  
The success of SASOL is largely attributed to government support in the form of 
subsidies, that the entity received under the apartheid government from 1950 
onwards,and due to the sanctions that the country was subjected to during that 
regime.The sanctions served as an indirect policy framework that protected and 
developed the petro-chemical industry in South Africa. Disruptions in trade relations 
withIran as a result of therevolution in Iranin 1979 impacted the supply of crude oil into 
South Africa. This required an emergency expansion of SASOL. The government 
lacked the resources to invest and therefore raised the funds on the stock exchange, 
effectively privatising the SASOL SOE (Ebrahim, 2015; Sparks, n.d.). 
 Angola’s oil production is due to its endowment. The Cabinda off-shore reserves were 
discovered by US MNCs in the 1950s. Cabinda Gulf Oil (Cabgoc now a part of 
Chevron) was the first company to be given concession rights in the Cabinda region in 
1957.Numerous other foreign companies and FDI flows have entered the country’s oil 
sector since(Redvers, 2013). Although FDI flows have brought about significant growth 
of the oil industry, all the crude oil is exported out of SADC due to the already 
mentioned limitations of the lack of infrastructure as well as foreign obligations in terms 
of honouring contracts to trading partners with ex SADC countries (Redvers, 2013; 
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Kiala&Ngwenya, 2011).The implication of this reality for non-oil producing RMCs is that 
oil has to be procured from overseas countries that have large refining capacities of 
between 200k to 300kbbl/d. This effectively reduces the gains of downstream forward 
opportunities, particularly economic linkages into the petro-chemical industry that the 
region could exploit, due to crude oil refining activities(EIA, 2005; Redvers, 2013).Table 
1shows the SADC oil production, resources and estimated recoverable resources. 
TABLE 1: SADC OIL PRODUCTION, RESOURCES AND ESTIMATED ULTIMATE 
RECOVERY, 2013 (MT) 
Source: BGR, (2010) 
The estimated ultimate recovery measures the likelihood of finding oil reserves given 
the geographic formulation of the land and sea beds. The EUR estimates take into 
account both the proven and unproven oil discoveries. Angola and Mozambique have 
the highest EUR estimates. While it is well known that Angola has large oil resources, 
Mozambique has very little oil production but a considerable amount of natural gas 
resources. The discovery of natural gas in Mozambique increases the likelihood of 
future discoveries of oil hence the high EUR ratings in table 1. There have been some 
oil discoveries in Ruvuma province and Sasol has been a key developer of oil 
exploration and production in the region. Although the discovery and production rates of 
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Angola 84.7 98% 1475 1723 52 3% 8398 69% 6923 
Congo, DRC 1.2 1% 45 24 145 8% 214 2% 169 
Madagascar 0.0 0% – – 90 5% 90 1% 90 
Mozambique 0.0 0% – 2 2 0% 2002 16% 2002 
Namibia 0.0 0% – – 150 9% 150 1% 150 
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Total  86.1 100% 1536 1751 1719 100% 12152 100% 10616 
*EUR: estimated ultimate recovery. Source BGR 2014 
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oil are relatively low at this point in time there is significant potential for eastern SADC if 
Mozambican oil reserves are discovered and the required infrastructure to extract and 
distil them is constructed under the right policy umbrella(Andruleit et al, 2014). 
 
2.1 Overview: Historical and existing liquid fuels infrastructure 
The post-independence Malawian government like other newly independent African 
states invested heavily in infrastructure (Mkandawire, 2010). The petroleum 
infrastructure that the Malawian government invested in comprised of the following:  
 Petroleum storage tanks in Mbeya in south-western Tanzania north of the 
Malawian border; 
 The MV Ufulu which is a water vessel designed to carry petroleum fuels and in 
the Chipoka; and 
 Chilumba ports in the north and southern districts of Malawi (Kalinga, 2011). 
Zambia and Tanzania both invested in rail and pipeline infrastructure. The TANZAM 
pipeline is 1700km long. It connects the Dar es Salaam port to the TAPEIR refinery 
(Tanzania) as well as to the Indeni refinery in Zambia. The Tazara railway line was 
completed in 1975 and stretched from the Dar es Salaam port in Tanzania through the 
south-western town of Mbeya (232km north of the Chilumba port in Malawi) to the 
central province of Zambia which is known for copper production (Kalinga, 2011).   
In 1987 the governments of Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania signed an agreement that 
opened up the north corridor for Malawi. This meant cargo (both wet and dry) could be 
transported by rail and the TANZAM pipeline to the south-western Tanzanian town of 
Mbeya and then transported by road to the Chilumba port in northern Malawi.  Cargo 
could then be loaded onto the water vessels: the MV Illala, MV Mtendere and the MV 
Ufulu that would transport wet and dry cargo to the central and southern districts of 
Malawi (Kalinga, 2011). This was followed by the rehabilitation of the southern corridor 
that was affected by Renamo insurgents during the civil war in Mozambique. The 
southern rail-corridor connects the port of Beira (Mozambique) to Blantyre (Malawi). It 
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then connects to Salima (Chipoka port) and Lilongwe and ends at the Zambian border 
in Chipata (Jica, n.d.; Kalinga 2011). 
The civil war and political instability in Mozambique, which was partially fuelled by 
Malawi, influenced the Malawian government to look at the southern, central and 
northern corridors as alternative routes that could be utilised to transport petroleum and 
diesel fuel into Malawi. The Shire Zambezi waterway is another infrastructure project 
that has the potential toprovide an alternative corridor for the transportation of liquid 
fuels (Lalbahadur, 2013). It is a historic route that Europeans and early missionaries (Dr 
David Livingstone) are said to have used when they explored Southern Africa (Kalinga, 
2011). 
This river transport route flows from the Indian Ocean at the Mozambican old port of 
Chinde, into Zambezi River and then into the Shire Riverto Malawi’s southern districts of 
Nsanje and Chikwawa(AFDB, 2014;Lalbahadur, 2013). Arguably the Shire Zambezi 
waterway project goes against political interests of some lobby groups in both Malawi 
and Mozambique that are heavily invested in road transport (Ncube, Roberts &Vilakazi, 
2014; Lall, Wang &Munthali, 2009).  
Competition from trucking and the mismanagement of the lake services of Malawihad a 
detrimental impact on infrastructure maintenance and the development of water and rail 
transport in Malawi (Kalinga, 2011). The former SOE Lake services was responsible for 
the development and governance of water and rail transport in the country. 
Mismanagement and influence of SAPs have led to the privatisation and unbundling of 
the entity (Mathur, 2000).   The water transport operations of Lake Services are now 
under private control of the Brazilian company, MotaEngil, which is constructing the 
Nacala Rail corridor (MotaEngil, 2013).  
The rail operations are under the control of The Central East African Railway Company 
(CEAR). Investments in new ships and locomotives for the transportation of people and 
cargo have taken place since this change of ownership. This policy stance could 
improve efficiency and channel investment into the rail and water transport 
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infrastructure that is needed to develop the aforementioned entities into economically 
viable entities that could compete with road transport in Malawi. The success of this 
PPP could have a positive impact on the pricing of the transportation of liquid fuels and 
therefore the pump price of liquid fuels.    
2.2 Overview: CTL/GTLTechnologies 
The discovery of large coal and gas reserves in Mozambique has attracted large flows 
of FDI.The quantity of the coal reserves is uncertain but BGR estimates that the Moatize 
region has reserves that amount to 23 (GT) (Bayura&Kessels, 2013).The Moatize coal 
production is mainly for export, however a portion of it could potentially beutilised in 
electricity generation, steel manufacturing industries and in liquid fuel productionfor the 
SADC region. One of the mining giants in the region is VALE and like SASOL, Vale 
received considerable State support from the Brazilian government and its success can 
largely be attributed to state support (Musacchio&Lazzarini, 2014). Part of Vale’s 
investment has been channelled to the development of the Nacala rail corridor. In 2010 
Vale acquired 51% of the Development Company of the Nacala Corridor (SDCN), 
which, in turn, holds most shares in The Central East African Railways Company 
(CEAR) (AFDB, 2015). The development of this transport infrastructure has provided 
essential opportunities and an alternative rail corridor to consider in assessing the 
viability of CTL technologies in the Moatize regionand potentially 
Malawi(Musacchio&Lazzarini, 2014). 
2.3 Overview: Lake MalawiPotential Oil Reserves 
The possibility of oil reserves in Lake Malawi have been a long debated issue. Some 
scholars argue that, if reserves are discovered, there is the on-going risk of a resource 
curse that has plagued most oil rich nations: Dutch disease, civil wars, oil spills and 
environmental concerns (Mehlum et al, 2006). It is not a far-fetched assertion to assume 
that drilling oil in Lake Malawi would result in the same fate that African exports suffer 
when it comes to value chains; export of crude oil and import of refined petroleum 
products: petrol and diesel.  
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The Malawian government has awarded exploration licences to SACOIL, Rakgas, 
Pacific Oil and Surestream Petroleum (Etter-Phoya, 2015). There was a ban on 
exploration in Lake Malawi that was imposed by the government due to a public outcry 
and fears of irregularities in the process of awarding licenses. This ban has recently 
been lifted allowing proceedings to continue.Figure 2 shows the licensing block 
distribution. 
 
FIGURE 2: MAP OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF LICENSING BLOCKS 
Source: www.energy-pedia.com, (n.d.) 
It should be noted that Malawi has about seven prominent tribes: Tumbuka, Tonga, 
Chewa, Ngoni, Lomwe, Nsena, Yao (Kalinga, 2011). Each of these tribes has their own 
distinct culture and language and all take ownership of Lake Malawi and its resources. 
This diversity in cultures could be a potential recipe for civil war in the country. Cultural 
differences in tradition and religion amongst the populations are areas that are targeted 
by interest groups that seek to destabilise regions (Rodney, 1973). 
Environmental lobby groups and theorists also have cause for concern as there have 
been numerous environmental violations by multinational companies in the past (Nixon, 
2008). The recent oil spills by British Petroleum off the Gulf of Mexico and the pollution 
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in the Nigerian delta are a few examples of this occurrence.It is important to give 
consideration to these realities of environmental abuses and potential civil wars 
occurring as policy makers should consider the development and capacity of their 
institutions in assessing whether these institutions are strong enough to bring 
multinational companies like Shell to account and to deal with extremist groups that may 
destabilise the region (Nixon, 2008).  
Lake Malawi has a depth of 700 meters. Drilling oil in Lake Malawi at this depth would 
be considered deep-water drilling and is therefore one of the riskiest and most 
expensive methods of drilling oil. It therefore poses environmental risks and financial 
implications. The fishing and tourism industry are significant sectors of the Malawian 
economy. Disruptions in these sectors could have massive socio-economic issues for 
lake communities therefore there is serious cause for concern(Deep Sea World, n.d; 
Golinska& Kawa, 2015; Nixon, 2008). Advancements in technology for deep oil drilling 
have been developed and made safer overtime. However, as oil spills are sometimes 
caused by human negligence and unforeseen circumstances the risks cannot be 
guaranteed. Environmental institutions in Malawi are also relatively weak, making their 
ability to monitor environmental abuses questionable (Mkondiwa, 2010).  
3. Refinery capacity in SADC 
The SADC region has a shortage of refineries. Most refineries are concentrated in 
South Africa. There is additional refining capacity in Luanda, Angola, Ndola, Zambia 
and the Congo. Previously Tanzania had refining capacity;however, it was closed down 
due to the structural adjustment programs in the early 1990s and early 2000s (Kalinga, 
2011; Redvers, 2013). There is therefore a total combined refining capacity of about 
550 k bbl/d. SADC currently consumes about 923k bbl/d (EIA, 2015). The deficit is met 
by offshore oil suppliers: from refineries in Singapore, India and other countries with 
larger refining capacity. Figure 3shows the refining capacity of countries in the region. 
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FIGURE 3: SADC CRUDE OIL DISTILLATION CAPACITY (KBBL/D). 
Source: US EIA,(2015) (www.eia.gov), Note: Although the US EIA reports a 15kbbl/d capacity in 
Tanzania, this has reportedly shut down. Also Oil, Gas Africa reports a Chevron Cabinda refinery of 
16kbbl/d. Source: US EIA 2015 (www.eia.gov) 
South Africa has a refining capacity of 485k bbl/d. Angola has a capacity of 39k bbl/d 
and Zambia has a capacity of about 24k bbl/d (EIA, 2015).Figure 4 showsthe estimated 
refined petroleum consumption of SADC.  
 
FIGURE 4: SADC ESTIMATED LIQUID FUELS CONSUMPTION 2013 (923KBBL/D) 
Source: CIA,(2015) 
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Total consumption of petroleum products in SADC is 923k bbl/d. South Africa 
contributes 66% of consumption. Angola follows with about 12% and the other RMCs 
collectively contribute 22%(CIA, 2015).Thereforethere is a current shortfall in refining 
capacity of 400k bbl/d. After the completion of both phases of the Sonaref Lobito 
refinery, which will have a capacity of 200kbbl/d, Angola will be in surplus and will 
reduce the current shortfall of 400k bbl/d to about 200k bbl/d in SADC. The shortfall will 
primarily be in South Africa. 
3.1 Refining Capacity in Angola 
Angola produces 2 million barrels of crude oil a day. The country has a refiningcapacity 
of 39k bbl/d of crude and a consumption rate of about 111k bbl/d. This effectively 
means there is a shortage of about 72k bbl/d (EIA, 2015). The limited diversification and 
concentration in oil production of the Angolan economy leave the country vulnerable to 
oil price shocks(Redvers, 2013;Golinska& Kawa, 2015).The limited refining capacity 
also limits the quantity of petro-chemicals available that can feed into manufacturing, 
agriculture and other industries that Angolan policy makers could exploit.  
The current reduction in oil prices has had significant implications for the Angolan 
economy. China has been a primary trading partner for Angola. In 2004 when Angola 
was seeking to rebuild war-torn infrastructure Western nations were reluctant to offer 
financial support. This coincided with changes in Chinese foreign policy that were 
seeking to partner up with African countries. This development led to the approval of a 
$2 billion loan from China to Angola. It was to be paid back with crude oil rather than 
hard currency but was free from the conditions of western conditionality (Yates, 2009). 
A series of economic exchanges and oil backed loans for investments have since 
followed, however the falling oil price has had implications on the Angolan government’s 
ability to service historical debt (Redvers, 2013; Yates, 2009).Figure 5 shows the oil 
price volatility from 2007 to 2015.  
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FIGURE 5: CRUDE OIL PRICE VOLATILITY (2007-15) 
Source: NASDAQ (2016) 
The above economic arrangements coupled with the few refineries in SADC mean that 
almost all crude that is extracted is exported. The main trading partners for Angola’s oil 
are China, India and the United States of America. Figure 6shows the distribution of 
Angola’s trading partners. South Africa is the only RMC that is in the top ten of Angola’s 
trading partners and accounts for only 4%. 
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FIGURE 6: ANGOLA TRADING PARTNERS 
Source: Redvers, (2013) 
The SADC region is a readily available market, but the lack of a pipeline network, rail 
and refining capacity makes it an inaccessible one. It is therefore more economical for 
RMCs to import refined petroleum from ex- SADC sources. However, there are 
announcements of PPP projects that are being looked at to connect Angola to Zambia 
(Udoh, 2012; Mfula, 2012). One particular project is the AZOP pipeline that is designed 
to transport multiple finished products including petrol, low sulphur diesel, Jet fuel and 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) to Zambia, and the Katanga Province in the DRC 
(Udoh, 2012; Mfula, 2012). 
The above pipeline project is reported to commence after the completionof the Sonaref 
Lobito refinery that will have a total capacityof 200k bbl/d. This will put Angola in surplus 
of petroleum fuels. The surplus of refined petroleum in future could be exportedto 
Zambia via the AZOP pipeline or via the rehabilitated Bengula railway line. In addition to 
the central SADC market, Angola could supply western SADC market (Namibia, DRC) 
via sea tankers (SADC, 2012). 
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3.2 Refinery Capacity in Zambia 
Zambia has some oil refining capacity that is controlled and owned by the government 
of Zambia. The Indeni refinery has the capacity of 24k bbl/d. Zambia has no known 
reserves of oil and therefore has no production of crude oil (Rukuru, 2013). The 
TANZAM pipeline between Tanzania and Zambia was initially constructed 1968 to 
transport crude from the Dar es Salaam ports and TAPEIR refineries (Kalinga, 2011). It 
stretches 1,700 km and has a capacity to transport a million tons of crude a 
year(Cilliers&Mashele, 2006). 
TheIndeni refinery is not configured to fully process pure crude oil. It is a simple refinery 
and therefore it is not sophisticated enough to process pure crude as it cannot crack or 
break the heavier fuel oils into lighter petroleum products like petrol and diesel. Being a 
simple refinery, Indeni therefore processes a spiked or commingled feedstock. This 
feedstock is imported primarily from the Middle East and is transported to Indeni via the 
TANZAM pipeline (Zambian Energy Regulation Board, n.d.). The Indeni refinery does 
not have the capacity to amply serve Zambia’s growing demand of liquid fuels. 
Therefore this motivates the development of the AZOP pipeline that could prospectively 
fill the deficit from the Sonaref Lobito Refinery.Figure 7 shows the TANZAM pipeline 
route. 
 
FIGURE 7: TANZAM PIPELINE ROUTE 
Source:  Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority,(n.d) 
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3.3 Refining Capacity South Africa 
South Africa has the highest demand for liquid fuels in the region.  The country also has 
the most refining capacity. Shell, Total, Chevron, Engen and Sasol are companies that 
have controlling interests in South Africa’s oil refining industry.Table 2shows South 
Africa’s ownership and crude throughput. 
South African Refinery Ownership and Crude Throughput  
Crude Oil Refined at the following refineries:  
Name  Crude throughput  Ownership  
Chevref 100,000 bpsd Chevron South Africa  
Enref 125,000 bpsd Engen Petroleum  
Natref 92,000 bpsd Sasol/Total South Africa 
(64/36%)  
Sapref 180,000 bpsd Shell South Africa/BP Southern 
Africa (50/50%)  
Coal and Gas Processed and Refined at:  
Sasol Secunda 150,000 bpsd Sasol  
(Crude equivalent @ average yield)  
Gas Processed and Refined at  
PetroSA 45,000 bpsd PetroSA 
(Crude equivalent @ average yield)  
TABLE 2: SOUTH AFRICAN OWNERSHIP AND CRUDE THROUGHPUT 
Note: PetroSA has run out of gas reserves. Source: Department of Energy South Africa (2013) 
Despite the development of the liquid fuels sector in South Africa there is still an 
eminent shortage in refining capacity. The country currently consumes approximately 
609k bbl/d and has a refining capacity of 485k bbl/d. The shortage of 124k bbl/d could 
prospectively be addressed with the development of the Mthombo refinery.  
The mooted MthomboPort Elizabeth refinery is projected to have the capacity of about 
200-300k bbl/d. This would effectively put South Africa in surplus and cater for future 
demand growth. The project is projected to have substantial economic gains.  It is 
expected to create between 12 000 and 21 000 direct & indirect jobs during construction 
& between 2 000 & 5 000 when operational (PetoSA, n.d). Despite the announcements 
of the Mthombo refinery, the development of this refinery remains uncertain as Port 
Elizabeth has no pipeline connection to the market (Gauteng).  
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3.4 Refining capacity in other RMCs 
Other RMC’s account for about 22% of consumption. This equates to about 200k bbl/d 
and could substantiate the development of a refinery of that size. However, the 
geographical distances and lack of interconnecting infrastructure make this a challenge 
logistically. Therefore it is more affordable for these RMCs to import refined petroleum 
fuels from ex SADC sources until regional investments in infrastructure have taken 
place. Malawi and several other RMCs have the infrastructural base on which they 
could build on. Particularly rail and water interconnecting bodies that could be 
rehabilitated to compete with road transport. This could be done to increase competition 
with road transport and therefore reduce the price of petroleum fuels. 
4 Development of current infrastructure for transporting and refining 
crude oil and products 
‘The most outstanding characteristic of the transportation systems of Africa is the 
comparative isolation in which they have developed within the confines of individual 
countries and territories. This is reflected in the lack of links between countries and 
territories within the same geographical sub-region” (United Nations Commission, 1959 
in Rodney, 1973 p 355).  
This statement sums up the reality in the SADC region. There are limited rail and oil 
pipeline interconnections in the region. Firms and stakeholders in different respective 
RMCs face logistical challenges in transporting wet and dry cargo in and around the 
region (SADC, 2012).  Regional bodies like SADC and the EAC are a right step in 
developing regional infrastructure interconnectors amongst RMCs however there is 
need for a bigger economic push and commitment from respective governments.  
One of the visions of SADC is to develop efficient and seamless infrastructure that 
connects the region. The island transport systems within RMCs need to be connected to 
allow for the efficient movement of people and cargo. This could be done through 
making motion towards the: 
• Alignment of strategic intent for an efficient integrated corridor development plan 
by all stakeholders, operators on rail and water corridors 
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• Development of a seamless rail logistics corridor that will promote the migration 
of traffic from road to rail and offer a competitive, complete and integrated rail 
logistics solution.  
• Development of an investment plan that will be used by all rail operators to plan 
and implement required infrastructure development along the corridor and cater 
for growing freight volumes.  
• Development of an operational strategy which will determine how rolling stock 
will be designed, acquired, funded and operated across the corridor 
Nepad, (2016). 
4.1 Malawi: Exploited and unexploited Infrastructure: railway, waterway and 
trade corridors 
The SADC region has several trade corridors that serve the region and provide key 
interconnections between nations via a combination of road, rail and water transport. 
Rail infrastructure was primarily developed in colonial eras to transport capital goods, 
minerals and labour between colonies. It was largely centred on mining activities 
(Rodney, 1973). These interconnections provide an insight on how liquid fuels are 
traded and transported to landlocked countries predominantly Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. These interconnections further form a basis on how best these resources 
could be traded and transported amongst landlocked RMCs in the region (SADC, 2012; 
Kalinga, 2011).  
Malawi utilises four transport routes for liquid fuels to enter the country namely: 
theNacala road/rail transport corridor, the Tanzanian road transport corridor, the Beira 
road transport corridor as well as the Beira rail corridor that stretches to Blantyre 
(Limbe). The Beirarail corridor has connections to Salima (Chipoka port). It then 
stretches to Lilongwe and finally to the Zambian border post.  Industry players utilise 
these three routes to ensure the continuous flow of liquid fuels given the realities of 
political instabilities and diplomatic tensions that flare up from time to time between 
nations (Kalinga, 2011; CEAR, n.d.). 
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Malawi is reliant on Tanzanian and Mozambican ports to service the country for liquid 
fuels. The lack of refineries in the region means Malawian oil industry players have to 
import refined petroleum products from Singapore, India and other countries that have a 
surplus refining capacity (Redvers, 2013). The purchased petroleum products are then 
transported to Beira and Nacala ports. Petroleum products are then transported by road 
to southern central Malawi and then distributed in the country by road transport(Jica,  
n.d). 
This dynamic has created a trucking community in the country that is a very powerful 
lobby that attracts rent seeking politicians to invest in and promote the industry by 
adopting certain policies that favour road transport over other modes of transport that 
could compete, and otherwise reduce the cost of transporting fuel (Kalinga, 
2011;Cilliers&Mashele 2006; Lall et al, 2009). 
Re-evaluating this paradigm offers some key economic insight as to how these 
unexploited infrastructures could be exploited and developed to reach better economic 
outcomes.Figure 8shows a map of railway and road infrastructure available to the 
SADC region.  
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FIGURE 8: TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE MAP 
Source: SADC, (n.d) 
4.2 Railway routes to Mozambique 
Malawi has both rail and water inter-connections with Mozambique. The Nacala corridor 
has opened up the central corridor that connects Malawi to the port of Nacala and gives 
Malawi access to the sea. Theoretically it should be cheaper to transport liquid fuels via 
rail directly from the port in Nacala however rail in SADC has been characterised with 
several challenges including delays, inadequate infrastructure and the handing over of 
freight to other locomotive companies in different RMCs (Nepad, 2016). 
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The Malawian and Mozambican rail operations are operated by CEAR a company 
which is controlled by Vale as per Vale’s 51% acquisition of the NacalaRail 
Development Company in 2010 (AFDB, 2015). Therefore it could expected that some of 
the challenges will be limited if it is run and regulated efficiently as there is one operator 
controlling freight in both countries.There is also a challenge with having CEAR as the 
only operator on the Nacala corridor as the company may limit how much capacity is 
given to other general cargo (Nepad, 2016). There is therefore q need for strong 
regulation from both governments to ensure that CEAR does not abuse its market 
power.The Nacala rail development has further spurred the development of the Liwonde 
inland port. The inland terminal will accommodate transit freight that is destined for 
Malawi and also to handle future export commodities that are destined for the Moatize 
region (AFDB, 2015).  
The southern corridor connects Malawi to the port of Beira. This is also an alternative 
route to transport liquid fuels from Mozambique to Malawi. The road link to Beira is 
utilised heavily, however the rail remains underutilised in Malawi. The section in Donna 
Anna (Mozambique) that links the Mozambican rail to the Malawi rail was cut off but has 
since been rehabilitated and deemed to be in a fair condition (Jica,n.d).The Sena rail 
has the capacity to carry 6 Mt/y tons of cargo and once utilised effectively by Malawi,will 
provide a valuable alternative corridor that will complement the Shire Zambezi waterway 
(if it comes into operation). 
4.3 Shire Zambezi waterway Malawi and Mozambique 
The Shire Zambezi Waterway is a historical route that early European settlers used to 
access and explore the region. The waterway flows from the Indian Ocean north into the 
Zambezi River from the Mozambican port town of Chinde. The Zambezi meets one of 
its main tributaries: the Shire River; that connects Malawi and Mozambique (Kalinga, 
2011). 
The Shire Zambezi water way project has interested Malawian, Zambian and 
Mozambican governments for reasons affecting the affordability of cargo. Cargo 
destined for Malawi and Zambia would be cheaper to transport via this route as 
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opposed to the predominant road transport that is currently utilised from Mozambican 
ports. The feasibility study that was carried out concluded that the development of this 
route istechnically feasible however the viability and long term sustainability rests on the 
investment and coordination of the beneficiaries of the project: Malawi, Mozambique 
and Zambia(African water Facility, 2011;Canhanga, 2014). 
4.4 Tanzania waterway and rail connection and TANZAMpipeline 
Tanzania and Malawi share a water body, Lake Malawi. North of Lake Malawi is the 
TAZARA railway line that connects the port of Dar es Salaam to the Copperbelt of 
Zambia. This railway line passes through the town of Mbeya 126km north of the 
Chilumba port (Kalinga, 2011). This port has both road and rail connections into Zambia 
and eastwards to Dar es Salaam. This infrastructure provides a significant transport 
route both to access markets and source raw materials for industry.The 
TANZAMpipeline runs through Mbeya before proceeding to the Ndola refinery. 
The former regime of Kamuzu Banda invested in some key infrastructure to transport 
liquid fuels are available to Malawian authorities. Storage tanks were built in Mbeya to 
store refined petroleum products for Malawi. The MV Ufulu is a water tanker that was 
also purchased to transport liquid fuels in the country from north to the south of 
Malawi.(Kalinga, 2011; SADC, 2011).  The growth of competition from the trucking 
industry coupled with the underinvestment in the Lake Malawi transport service, led to 
the running down of these facilities. 
Consequently, Malawi has one of the highest pump prices for liquid fuels in the region. 
This is because of the inadequate maintenance and utilisation of infrastructure for 
transporting liquid fuels. The government levies are also high due to the limited tax base 
(low bbl/d requirement). The flow of this price build up is shown in Figure 9. 
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FIGURE 9: PRICE BUILD OF IMPORTED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
Source: Malawi Energy Regulatory Authority, (2016) 
5 CTL/ GTL 
Historically CTL technologies have been utilised in periods of crises and conflict due to 
the costs associated with developing these facilities, relative to conventional liquid fuels. 
Fortunately, today with technological advances these facilities have become modular 
and consequently, more economically viable for developing nations to pursue in 
achieving their liquid petroleum goals. Botswana, Malawi and Ethiopia are exploring the 
adoption of utilizing CTL and GTL technologies (Malawi Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
2014; Holland Hauseberger, 2015). If implemented effectively this will be a strategic 
move toward strategic import substitution industrialisation.A modular CTL facility would 
not only produce liquid fuels but also other petro-chemicals that could be fed into other 
industries such as fertiliser production, plastics and polymers and the syngas could be 
utilised for power generation (Vallentine, 2008;Alfstad, 2015; Malawi Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, 2014).Figure 10 illustrates this process. 
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FIGURE 10: SIMPLE CTL FACILITY. 
Source: encyclopedia of sustainability science and technology,(2012) 
5.1 CTL /GTL a case for Malawi 
Malawi has a limited industry and is a small consumer of liquid fuels. Malawi consumes 
approximately 10k bbl/d of liquid fuels (petroleum & diesel) (EIA, 2015). Much of this is 
used to power motor vehicles for transportation rather than to power heavy industry. 
The problem with this is that Malawi and much of the SADC community import refined 
products at a higher price per barrel, because of lack of transport infrastructure in the 
region that increases transport costs. However,when considering this technology one 
has to consider the size, scale, transport routes, sources of raw materials and country 
legislation to assess the economic viability of such an investment (FT expert, personal 
communication, February 19, 2016). 
5.2 Size and scale 
The challenge with Malawi (as highlighted earlier) is that the market size is relatively 
small(approximately 10k bbl/d). One could consider the market in Tete, Mozambique, 
Zambia and possibly Tanzania. Legislation in Malawi does not allow for export of 
petroleum products (Carter, 1997). This was a historical law that was aimed at 
protecting the petroleum supplies that are imported into the country, toreduce room for 
arbitrage between Malawi and its neighbours. Consequently a CTL solution that serves 
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domestic requirements is more suitable for Malawi(Anonymous FT expert, personal 
communication, February 19, 2016; Sparks, n.d.). 
Modular plants are not constrained by the initial size of the plant as they can be 
upgraded at later stages to accommodate for local consumption increases or increases 
in the demand of neighbouring countries (Golinska& Kawa, 2015).CTL facilities require 
continuous supplies of coal and therefore aside from domestic resources RMCs wishing 
to establish CTL technologies need  to consider alternative supply options of sourcing 
coal. Malawi has supply options in Tanzania & Mozambique. 
5.3 Raw Material Sources of Coal: Tete, Moatize Coal reserves 
Estimates of coal resources in Mozambique are uncertain. BGR estimates Mozambican 
coal reserves  of 23 Gt. Recoverable reserves are estimated to be at 849 Mt, which 
comprises a mix of thermal (25–30%) and coking (70–75%) hard coal (Bayura&Kessels, 
2013). VALE plans to increase their production to 20 million tonnes a year. This will 
require added capacity which is expected to cost a further investment of $4.4 billion 
(Bayura&Kessels, 2013). Vale in conjunction with CEAR has constructed the 
aforementioned Nacala rail that passes through Malawi. Nacalais considered to be a 
more viable deep sea bay for the deep sea vessels versus the other ports, for example 
the port of Beira(Sena line) hence the development of the Nacala rail(Campbell, 2013). 
Some of the Tete coal is available to Malawi. Part of the agreement between the 
Malawian and Mozambican authorities and VALE SA was to provide the Malawian 
government with a concession to transport a certain tonnage of coal on the railway line 
for use in Malawi and once fully operational, the Nacala corridor will earn the Malawi 
government $8 million a year (Scholvin&Plagemann, 2014). This particular concession 
would contribute to the quantity of coal reserves available for CTL facilities in Malawi. 
Figure 11 shows the route of the Nacala corridor.  
In addition to the above, the Moatize coal mine contains coking coal a primary resource 
that is used in steel production. The price of coking coal is higher than the price of the 
normal steam coal. However for the mining companies to access this coking coal they 
have to remove the steam coal that lies on top of the coking coal. Primarily the steam 
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coal is waste coal andcould be marketable to overseas markets with cleaning to achieve 
the requisite quality attributes, but attracts a much lower price (FOB port).Therefore the 
steam coal would best be beneficiated locally for the Mozambique market or for 
surrounding markets.One way to utilise thermal coal is to use it in power generation, 
CTL/GTL technologies or in a combination both power and liquid fuel production. 
 
FIGURE 11: NACALAMOATIZE RAILWAY MAP 
Source: Hudson, (2009) 
5.4 Raw Material Sources of Coal Tanzanian coal reserves 
Tanzania hosts approximately 5 billion tonnes of proven coal reserves in Tanzania 
(Dodson, 2013). The coalfields with the highest potential are Ketawaka-Mchuchuma in 
the Ruhuhu basin, Ngaka fields in the south-west of Tanzania and the SongweKiwira 
fields (Dodson, 2013). This coal is primarily used for domestic use and power 
generation. With the revised coal reserves, the country plans to increase its coal-fired 
power generation capacity and could potentially increase current levels of exports 
(Dodson, 2013). The addition to the reserves has attracted Investment from China, 
Australia and from the Dangote group to develop coal power plants in the country. 
This added investment will increase Tanzanian coal mining production and could 
potentially provide an alternative avenue for sourcing the coal. The Ngaka coal fields 
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are in close proximity to Malawi’snorthern rail and water corridor.Although this corridor 
is underutilised by Malawian industry players, it could prove to be a competitive solution 
to transport coal into the country and petroleum fuels out of the country. The increased 
production in Tanzanian coal mining activities will increase output and there could 
potentially be a surplus of coal that could be exported to Malawi for CTL conversion 
processes in future. Figure 12 shows the route of the northern corridor. 
 
FIGURE 12: THE TAZARA RAILWAY LINE 
Source: Zambia Railway authority, (n.d.) 
5.5 Raw Material Sources of Coal: Malawian coal reserves 
Malawi has estimated coal reserves of 800 million tons (Malawi Ministry of Mining & 
Energy, 2009). Most of the economic grades of coal are located in the north of Malawi 
and have a lower ash content making the northern coal reserves less denser and 
therefore, more viable for CTL processes than coal resources in the south (Cairncross, 
2014). Coal resources in the south could still be used, it simply means that due to the 
lower quality attributes more coal per barrel would have to be used than the coal 
reserves of the north (Ministry of Energy & Mines, 2015). 
Currently, Mchenga is the biggest coal mine in Malawi. It operates at a capacity of 5000 
tons of coal per month (60kt/y); suggesting that the coal reserves in Malawi are largely 
unexploited.  Nonetheless, like in the case of Mozambique one would have to utilise the 
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transport infrastructure available: waterways, rail and road that have already been 
discussed.  
5.6 Economic viability of Raw Material Sources 
The aforementioned sources of coal are all potential sources however there are three 
main primary locations that are potentially strategic because of the availability of low 
cost coal. The first strategic location to construct a CTL facility would be in Tete. The 
second strategic location would be to construct the CTL facility in Mwanza 300kms 
north-east of Tete that relies on the transportation of Tete coal into Malawi.The third 
option is to construct the facility based on indigenous coal reserves at coal mines in the 
north or the south of Malawi.  
5.6.1 CTL Facility in Tete for Mozambique and Malawi 
The Moatize coal reserves contain coking coal that attracts a higher FOB price than 
steam coal. In order for mining companies to access this coking coal they have to lift a 
considerable amount of thermal coal off the roof of the mines. This consequently makes 
the thermal coal a waste product for the mining companies. The thermal coal attracts 
storage costs and creates safety hazards as coal is pyrophoric. Therefore, by 
companies storing it in large storage facilities they run the risk of fires developing in the 
mining facilities. It is therefore likely that mining companies will be willing to flog the coal 
at very low prices. Consequently, a regional CTL facility based in Tete would have 
access to an abundant cheap source of coal (Global CCS Institute, n.d).  
The reduction in transport costs (that would otherwise accrue if the coal was bought and 
transported to Malawi) would increase the viability of the project and could potentially 
motivate the development of a product pipeline to transport refined petroleum fuels to 
Malawi. Currently Malawi falls under the SADC umbrella and certain goods are 
exempted from import taxes. Currently there is no legislation governing the importation 
of fuel that is manufactured in Mozambique because there is no petroleum production in 
Mozambique. Negotiations with government officials will therefore have to take place to 
strategize how the developer could access the Malawian market and to assess the 
willingness for Malawi to participate in the development of a facility under a joint venture 
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agreement that would increase the scale and demand of the market. It is however 
unlikely that the government of Malawi would be willing to forego tax revenues that are 
earned by the importation of petroleum fuels if the financial gains from the CTL facility 
are not greater than the current earnings. The second alternative for Malawi is to 
purchase the coal from Tete and transport it to Malawi via the Nacala corridor (Malawi 
Energy Regulatory Authority, 2016: Malunga&Phalira, 2014).  
5.6.2 CTL Facility in Mwanza Malawi 
Constructing a CTL facility in Mwanza would attract transport costs that make the 
project less economical than developing the plant in Tete. However, if legislation is 
drafted that makes petroleum products produced in Mozambique liable for an import 
levy then the viability of setting up this facility in Malawi based on Tete coal increases as 
currently coal is duty free and locally produced fuel would not attract an import duty. The 
third alternative is to set up the facility based on Malawian coal reserves (Malawi Energy 
Regulatory Authority, 2016: Malunga&Phalira, 2014).  
5.6.3 CTL Facility based on Malawian Coal 
Mining production in Malawi has remained at relatively low levels of output. Economic 
analysts have raised concern over the duty free tax on coal imports.  The negative 
performance of coal mines is partly attributable to the inefficiencies in local coal mining 
operations that consequently mean that local mining companies find it difficult to 
compete with foreign competitors. A CTL facility would increase the demand for local 
coal however it would require recapitalization of local mining companies in order for 
them to increase their annual production. This would increase the price of coal per ton 
as local coal miners would have to charge a premium price for the coal in order to 
service debt and operations and because the coal would be a primary commodity (not a 
waste commodity as in the case of Tete coal)(Chikoko,2016: Global CCS Institute, n.d). 
Therefore the success of the project and chosen strategy is ultimately dependent on the 
alignment of political interests with commercial interests. The project promoter would 
have to negotiate with policy makers both in Mozambique and Malawi in order to assess 
the willingness of the governments to harmonize their petroleum policies. At this point in 
 37 
time a CTL plant located at the Tete coal reserves appears to be the most strategic 
location to develop a CTL plant because of the availability of the raw material.  
5.7 Capital requirements and funding and pricing models 
Building this sort of industry requires large capital requirements and investor support. 
SASOLhave recently announced that they will not be developing anymore large CTL 
facilities due to the environmental impacts of their chemical processes. SASOL’s focus 
is therefore expected to be on developing GTL technologies that pose less 
environmental problems. This effectively suggests that SASOL funding will flow to 
Mozambique, Tanzania and other countries that have recently discovered large natural 
gas reserves (Radebe,2012). 
Given Malawi’s economic woes at the moment, the government is not in a position to 
commit any financial resources of their own.However, the Malawian governmentis 
willing to offer political support in terms of providing land, tax breaks, import parity 
pricing models, offering land for development and in negotiating offtake agreements 
(Ministry of Trade & Industry, 2014).  
In order to obtain funding and increase the viability of a project of this scale, developers 
are put in a better position if they obtain offtake agreements that guarantee that 
government will purchase the product produced. Inthis case negotiations on offtake 
agreements range from petroleum products, electricity, polymers and plastics,sulphur 
and other by-products (Nepad, 2016).  
However, as highlighted before, the success of PPPs and economic distribution largely 
depend on the cooperation between the public and private sector participants involved 
in negotiations. Without this cohesion the sustainability of such a project is not 
particularly convincing (SADC, 2011). Malawi’s experience with the Kayelekera uranium 
mine has provided keylessons for government and hasshed light on the importance of 
the cohesion of public and private sector participants(Banda, 2015;Amsden, 2007). 
5.8 Economic Benefits of CTL in Malawi 
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5.8.1 Reduction of the Malawian importation Bill 
 
Petroleum products and chemical fertilizers are amongst the top two imports for Malawi. 
Currently Malawi relies solely on imported refined petroleum products. The country 
imports about 8 000 barrels per day while the average daily fuel demand is currently 
estimated at 1.124 million litres which translates to 33.6 million litres per month or 
annual budget equivalent of US$366 million (Lanjesi, 2011).The import bill has been 
continuously increasing in recent years which imposes a serious financial burden on a 
developing country that already suffers the problem of huge public debt.A major 
consumer of the liquid fuel is the transportation sector (89.99%), followed by domestic 
(5.25%), industry (2.87%), and agriculture (1.9%) (Phiri, 2006). The second largest 
export in Malawi are chemical fertilizers (Taulo, Gondwe&Adoniya, 2015: Kamphanje, 
2012). 
Malawi is an agrarian economy that relies on subsistence farming and some 
commercial agricultural farms. The fertilizer subsidy was introduced during the 
BinguWaMutharika regime. Initially the program was faced with a lot of criticism 
however the total production that year put Malawi in surplus and resulted in exports to 
Zimbabwe. This policy stance has been implemented year on year and has become a 
politically motivated policy. The Malawian government allocates about $128 Million to 
the Fertilizer Import Subsidy Program and this too is a relatively high figure for a 
developing economy. A modular CTL facility has the potential to alleviate some of these 
issues (Taulo, Gondwe&Adoniya, 2015: Kamphanje, 2012).  
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5.8.2 Beneficiation of By-products: Linkages into fertilizer production and 
opportunities for supply industries 
The conversion of coal to liquid fuels technology has issues of high capital costs, 
environmental concerns, potentially high price floors (depending on the volatility of the 
oil price) and the cost of importation of coal.  Nevertheless, a modular facility that can 
cater for Malawi’s fuel needs would effectively reduce the burden on the import bill and 
save the country much needed foreign exchange provided capital controls are in place 
to prevent the extortion profits. If profits are invested locally the by-products: nitrogen 
and ammonia could motivate the development of a chemical facility complex in phase 
two of the development of the project. This would alleviate Malawi’s dependence on 
imports significantly and allow for foreign earnings to be devoted to other critical areas 
such as health and education (Taulo, Gondwe&Adoniya, 2015: Kamphanje, 2012). 
 Additionally, the development of such a facility will require the development of support 
industries in terms of consumables and other inputs. Theseupstream requirements can 
offer opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurs to set up businesses that integrate into 
the CTL facilities supply chain. Figure 13 summarises how the aforementioned facilities 
can be developed and illustrates linkages between them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supply Industries  
 40 
 
FIGURE 13 SUMMARY OF PROJECT INDUSTRIAL LINKAGES 
 
5.9 Environmental Concerns of CTL 
CTL facilities produce a higher carbon footprint than conventional fuels because in order 
to produce the liquids the process requires the burning of energy which in turn 
increases carbon emissions. Once the fuel is produced, the carbon therein is emitted 
when is consumed in combustion engines. Given the environmental concerns, 
international organisations are hesitant to fund projects that emit carbon. This could be 
a challenge for Malawi; however, given the countries low carbon emissions (due to the 
low industrial base), there is room for the country to manage its carbon emissions within 
its limits. If a regulatory institution is developed, further environmental concerns can 
effectively be managed to curb and reduce environmental impact.  
5.10 Import Substitution Industrialization in Malawi in CTL 
The ISI policy stance could be beneficial for Malawi in this sector however there are 
socio-economic dynamics and theoretical insight of ISI that should not be ignored.  
The import substitution theory rests on the idea of developing nations becoming self-
reliant by developing local infant industry to a point where domestic products can 
compete with imports. Nations have utilized a variety of devices that are protectionist in 
nature including nationalization policies, high tariffs, direct investment from national 
governments and over-valued exchange rates (Baer, 1972). Benefits of ISI include job 
creation and skills development as foreign production is substituted for domestic 
production (Kulkarni, 2009). Critics of this economic policy argue that protectionist policy 
reduce dynamism and therefore limit the access to cheap exports therefore departing 
from theories of comparative advantage that argue that nations should focus on the 
factors of production that their endowed in and trade those for other goods and service 
in order to achieve economic growth (Kulkarni, 2009). (Amsden, 2007) however argues 
that developing nations should adopt big push unbalanced growth models and engage 
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in industrial activities that they have no comparative in order to increase their industrial 
capabilities and linkages into the industrial sector. 
Although Malawi and other developing nations may well want to embark on this 
economic policy route as a way to grow their national industries, most are riddled with 
high public debt ratios, donor reliant funding and private investment to fund their socio 
economic sectors and to rebuild their infrastructure (Amsden, 1999). Depending on 
where the funding is sourced from there are usually conditions tied to procurement 
procedures that usually favour the home country developers. This effectively results in 
limited local participation by the host country population and if any is usually at the low 
skilled levels. This effectively limits skills and technological transfer. Therefore, the form 
ISI can take for developing countries in the 21st century is heavily reliant on the political 
will and their governments ability to negotiate and approve key projects that maximise 
economic linkages and that maximise local participation in order to assist in creating a 
pool of skills that can effectively operate and develop these technologies further 
maintain them once concessions with private developers and operators have expired. 
The length of the concessions granted must also be negotiated to ensure a facility taken 
control within its useful life (Chang, 1999: Baer, 1972: Pahariya, 2006).  
5.11 Development of current CTL facilities in SADC 
It is positive to note that national governments in the region are taking a key interest in 
these technologies to address the liquid fuels security issues that have been a major 
socio-economic challenge in the region. A 20000 barrel/day investment is being 
assessed out in Botswana that will ensure energy security in terms of liquid fuels in the 
country (Holland &Hauseberger, 2015). It will further give the economy of Botswana a 
yearly 830 million USD balance of trade benefit. The project has high socio-economic 
impact as construction spans 5 years and has an employment requirement of between 
in excess of 5000 at construction phase. This will provide significant employment 
opportunities for the Botswana economy that is no exception to the issues of youth 
unemployment. The total investment is about 4.2 billion dollars and is not limited to the 
production of liquid fuels alone (Sparks, 2013).   
 42 
Botswana is in advanced stages as it has been announced that Coal Petroleum will 
commence with this project. Other RMCs that do not have CTL technologies could soon 
follow, however it is important for RMCs to monitor the developments in Botswana and 
infrastructural upgrading projects in other RMCs, as there could be over capacity if 
investment is not coordinated with a regional aim (SADC, 2012). 
This interplay could provide key insight to import-substitution industrialisation in the 
SADC energy sector and perhaps will lead to the conclusion, that some ISI-scholars 
reach, that it works to a certain point and then collapses unless the markets open up; 
the case of Latin America (Amsden, 1997). Or it could lead to different conclusions and 
provide key lessons of the lessons of regional ISI in the SADC energy sector given the 
young levels of industrial development in Africa (Khan, 2010). Figure 14 shows how the 
development of a small scale CTL industry could be developed. Significant state 
support is necessary to apply import parity pricing mechanisms, offtake agreements 
amongst other political support that will increase the viability of this project. 
 
FIGURE 14: FLOW CHART CTL DEVELOPMENT MALAWI 
Source: Malawi Energy Regulatory Authority, (2016); Ministry of Trade & Industry, (2015) 
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5.12 GTL 
Natural gas discoveries in the Rovuma basin off the coast of Mozambique/Tanzania 
have attracted significant attention and investment. Anadarko have concessions on two 
blocks of the Rovuma basin. Anadarko and ENI are key players that are looking to 
develop blocks one and four. In order to make it practical and commercially viable to 
transport natural gas from one country to another, its volume has to be greatly reduced. 
To obtain maximum volume reduction, the gas has to be liquefied (condensed) by 
refrigeration to less than (Anadarko, n.d.).  
Consequently the USA and Italian companies are looking to establish two LNG trains 
each in Palma. These developments have interested companies like Sasol to develop 
GTL Plants in Palma.   These projects pose significant economic gains for Mozambique 
however there are socio-economic issues and lessons that the Mozambican policy 
makers would have to consider to prevent the effects of Dutch disease (Mathews, 
2014). 
The global decline in commodity prices has affected the viability of non-conventional 
projects of producing liquid fuels. Many tar sands and tight oil projects in North 
Americahave gone bankrupt with the current low oil price of $30-$40 per barrel 
(Golinska& Kawa, 2015). CTL and GTL technologies also require a price greater than 
$50-90, thus these projects are also negatively affected.  
5.13 Commodity price indices 
The global market has seen an economic slow-down. Commodity prices were largely 
driven up from the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s by the industrial growth of eastern Asia. 
The 2008 financial crises that began in America and affected the global market brought 
about a reduction in commodity prices. Metals and energy prices have (for the most 
part) decreased and are projected to decrease further (World Coal, 2016). This has had 
adverse impacts on non-conventional energy projects as the viability of such projects 
rested heavily on the historical high price of energy.  
At these lower prices it is not economically viable for investors, as it difficult for them to 
compete with conventional sources of oil. If Saudi Arabia increases output, lowering the 
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oil price, it consequently drives out investment the non-conventional sources of oil 
projects (Golinska& Kawa, 2015; Soderbergh, Robelius&Aleklett, 2007). It is important 
to pay attention to this dynamic and volatility of the price energy in assessing the 
viability of such CTL/GTL and other non-conventional sources.  
Price and income are not the only economic goals: there are other matters of national 
interest to consider such as domestic production to aid liquid fuels security and balance 
of payments. Naturally there is interplay between private and public sector interests, so 
it is a matter of balancing these interests and prioritizing goals to assess the viability of 
such projects (Amsden 2007; Index Mundi). Figure 15 shows the trend of commodity 
prices since 1992-2015. 
 
FIGURE 15: COMMODITY PRICE INDICES 
 Source: Index Mundi,(2016) 
6 Biofuels 
In the early 19th century when the early inventors were developing the first engines that 
the world would grow dependent on, Rudolf Diesel developed the first vegetable oil run 
engine. Comparatively, it was more efficient than the petroleum powered engine of that 
time. He however died a mysterious death on his way to present his engine to one of 
the biggest motor shows of that time (Bryant, 1976). Massive lobbying by firms that had 
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controlling stakes in the oil industry took place to persuade governments to opt for the 
oil and diesel engine instead of the bio-diesel powered engine. Nevertheless, in recent 
times, with the limitations of fossil fuels becoming more apparent than they were 
historically, a significant rise in global interest and production of biofuels has taken 
place; creating room for significant investment in unexploited regions of sub-Saharan 
Africa (Polasky, 2009). Unlike conventional petroleum based energy, biomass is not 
concentrated in a few countries and is uniformly distributed amongst all nations in the 
world. Every nation produces:  
 Agricultural waste; and  
 Agricultural crops. 
The key factor and difference in utilisation are the technological expertise and 
coordination between public and private sector participants in different countries (Khan, 
2013; Antoineli, Amidei&Fassio, 2014).  
6.1 Biofuels a case for MalawiSize Scale 
According to EIA statistics Malawi imports 9.2 k bbl/d. EIA, 2015). A 200 million litre 
biofuel facility would require an investment value of $150 millionand a similar project is 
currently under way in Queensland, Australia (Queensland Government, 2016).There is 
also a further range of pilot projects across Africa. The primary feedstocks for biofuel 
production include sugar fluids, Jatropha, soy beans, maize oil and waste, amongst 
other others. However there are some socioeconomic debates that tie into some of the 
oil seeds.Figure 16 shows the major feedstocks of biodiesel. 
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6.2 Potential feedstock for biodiesel production in Malawi 
 
FIGURE 16: MAJOR BIODIESEL FEEDSTOCKS   (2013) 
Source:  EIA, (2013) 
According to the Energy Information Agency (EIA) statistics of 2014 the main crop 
based feedstock were soybean, corn oil (in the U.S.A), canola oil, palm oil, amongst 
others. Soybean was responsible for about 50% of all biofuel production in the world. 
The Malawian government in 2013 rolled out initiatives to increase soy production by 
providing incentives such as providing the inputs (seeds, fertilisers) as well as engaging 
in offtake agreements with farmers (EIA, 2014).  
Soya beans are rich in oil and the cake is very nutritious and rich in protein. It is a 
critical food crop that is farmed extensively in Malawi and other nations in the region 
(Mullan, 2012). It is mostly processed into cooking oils, meat substitute’s, breakfast 
cereals for infants and for hospital patients as well as animal feeds of which the surplus 
is exported. Soy is a rich and ideal feedstock for biofuel production. Although the food 
displacement argument may apply here, as there is indeed an eminent food shortage, 
one could source the soy from outside Africa if supported by tax exemptions for 
importing the product. 
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Tobacco is one of Malawi’s main cash crops. The airline industry has expressed interest 
in greener jet fuels. Skynrgis a Netherlands based company that has genetically 
engineered a tobacco seed called Solaris. Once the tobacco seed has grown it 
produces an oil seed that has similar attributes to the jatropha oil seed. It is being rolled 
out to large scale tobacco farmers for mass production (ProjectSolaris, n.d). 
 Sugar cane is another major crop in Malawi. It is grown in the Shire Valley on extensive 
estates. Brazil has succeeded in producing bio-ethanol from sugar cane to a point 
where it is more affordable than conventional petrol at pump price due to tax differences 
and government support (Hall Matos SeverinoBeltra, 2009). Malawi and other RMCs 
could get valuable insights from Brazil’s biofuel policy (Mullan et al, 2014; Mkandawire, 
2010).  
Illovo sugar is actively producing ethanol from sugar cane in Malawi.Illovo’s ethanol 
production is however limited as the company does not produce it commercially. It is 
mainly to power their machinery for factory operations. This forms a basis for the 
government to engage Illovo to commercially produce ethanol through incentives and 
harmonisation of energy and agricultural sector policy frameworks. Illovo does not 
always utilise all of their available land and usually have extra planting capacity. 
Therefore plans could be developed for Illovo to utilise their extra fields with the 
guarantee that government or other private sector firms will buy production, whether it 
be sugar cane for ethanol or maize for biodiesel production. This economic 
arrangement was done before in 2010 (for food production not biofuels) but has not 
been repeated by the stakeholders (Illovo, 2013).  
Maize (corn) is a major crop all over the world andit is used as a staple food in most 
dishes acrosssouthern Africa. It is also a crop that can be used as a feedstock for both 
ethanol and biodiesel production (UNDP, 2010). However using maize for bioethanol 
and biodiesel has the potential to cause serious social issues as this is a key food crop 
and in Africa food security is at the centre of economic policy.It would be rather 
unreasonable to consider this as a suitable feedstock for biofuel production unless it 
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could be sourced cheaper from elsewhere in the world at more competitive rates than 
the revenues from biofuels(Mullan et al, 2012). 
Another important non-edible plant that has been studied extensively is Jatropha carcus 
(JC) (Aransiola et al, 2012; Aransiola et al., 2013).This crop can be planted on fields or 
as a boundary crop (fence around fields). It can grow even on land where normal 
cultivation crops fail to thrive (Mullan et al, 2012;Gui et al,2008;Kuntashula Vermeylen, 
2014). The private company Bio Energy Resources limited is encouraging rural 
communities to plant Jatropha as a boundary crop on a contractual farming basis (Berl, 
n.d.). Jatropha is inedible therefore food versus fuels debates do not apply to this 
particular crop. Table 3 shows the major feedstocks and their prospective yields.  
 
TABLE 3: INDICATIVE YIELDS AND FUEL EQUIVALENTS FOR COMMON BIOFUEL FEEDSTOCKS 
Source: Malitiz, Mapako& Brent,(2009) 
6.3Potential development and growth of biofuelindustry in Malawi 
In assessing the potential growth of biofuels in Malawi it is important to consider the 
implications of the reproduction of biofuel feedstocks in Malawi. With most of the 
population depending on the agricultural sector, it is important to consider how the 
agricultural sector could be enriched and sustained economically and geographically to 
meet food and energy requirements.   
Malawi is, a country with a climate and soil composition properties similar to that of 
parts of Brazil. Brazil is the home of the “Cerrado miracle”which saw a boom in soy 
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production by a process of enriching what was seen as unusable arable land (Gao et al, 
2008). This similarity in soil and climate suggests that Malawi could adopt a similar 
policy to increase soy production. Sugar cane production could be increased by 
engaging with private sector participants in Malawi (e.g. Illovo sugar) to increase their 
production of ethanol. The public sector would have to play a critical role in distributing 
land for biofuels feedstock cultivation. 
Rural land in the country is usually administered by chiefs and village headmen who 
have the capacity to determine ownership amongst the rural community (Van-
Vlaenderen, 2013). Although some land may appear unused, it usually has some social 
value for the community whether in the form of communal land for cattle grazing or crop 
rotation. Therefore it is relatively difficult to estimate how much land might be available 
for biofuel production. Nevertheless, it remains undeniable that large bodies of land do 
exist that could be used for biofuels feedstock production within the nation (Hall,2011). 
6.3 Infrastructure & Commodity Prices 
The available infrastructure discussed earlier in this paper could be utilised to transport 
biofuels around Malawi as well as be utilised to import the feedstocks from other 
countries that may have a surplus in maize production and provide a competitive supply 
option given logistical dynamics. Like CTL/GTL technologies, the viability of developing 
a biofuels sector rests heavily on the price of crude oil. At high oil prices these 
alternative resources become viable and at low prices the development of biofuels is not 
viable (see Figure 15) (Golinska& Kawa, 2012). 
However in order to secure national liquid fuels needs, biofuels could play a significant 
role in providing an alternative fuel source that consumers could choose from. Brazilian 
consumers for example have the option of purchasing ethanol gasoline or a 
combination of the two at the fuel pump. This competition creates a favourable dynamic 
for the consumer in terms of fuel prices. In order for Malawi to reach a level where this 
is possible substantial government support would be needed to provide renewable 
energy companies with a guaranteed price floor of about $50 if the price of oil drops 
below $50/bbl.State support could be in the form of guaranteeing similar policy 
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measures as those seen in CTL/GTL production: company rebates guaranteed price 
floors, tax exemptions, et al,together with political support. In addition to this, 
government would have to put policies in place that promote the importation of fuel flex 
vehicles that can either run on ethanol, gasoline or a blend of the two (UNDP, 2007). 
The Malawian government lacks a single policy document that governs the 
development of liquid fuels in the region. Therefore there has to be a harmonisation of 
policy in energy, agriculture and petroleum sectors to guide this process.Figure 17 
shows how a biofuel industry could be developed in Malawi. Critical to the development 
of this is government support in offering import parity pricing for several years amongst 
other benefits. 
 
FIGURE 17: FLOW BIOFUEL DEVELOPMENT 
MALAWI ENERGY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, 2016 
7 Political Economy Analysis PPPs, Foreign Aid, Technology Transfer 
7.1 Financing Liquid Fuels projects and issues of Localization 
Public and private cooperation is essential for liquid petroleum projects that have been 
discussed in this paper. Developing nations usually lack the resources on their own to 
fund projects of this scale.National budgets are limited and reliant on donor nations and 
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foreign funding (World Bank, 2010). A modular national CTL facility in Malawi would 
require an investment of 600 million dollars to 1.5 billion dollars. This is a heavy 
financial investment for Malawi considering that the country's national budget is about 1 
billion U.S dollars (Mbwan, 2016). 
Private sector finance could be used and funds could be sourced from abroad to build 
this technology. PPPs as highlighted earlier, must be approached with caution to 
increase the levels of local content requirements, technology sharing, minimum 
processing and profit sharing agreements (Amsden, 2007). This is important even more 
so because of the lack of an indigenous industrial bourgeoisie in the country that could 
invest in national industrial projects like these on their own. Government support is 
needed, as indigenous entrepreneurs are a constrained to finance and have numerous 
difficulties in accessing government protection (Rodney, 1973; Fine, 2006).  
Significant mining activity in the region has increased the need for infrastructure that is 
currently inadequate in SADC, to support mining industries. Heavy rail facilities, road 
networks and ports are limited in the region, therefore private companies are directly 
investing in the region to provide this infrastructure for example VALE. This private 
sector investment goes a long way in developing the region. Government intervention is 
primarily needed in this sector as more often than not aid is tied to conditionality to 
import capital equipment from the donor nation. This private investment is still a 
necessary source of investment or developing countries but it has to be met with 
supporting policies like capital controls to ensure the financial resources are 
regenerated (Amsden 2008; Chang, 2003). 
There is a growing trend of developing countries to own their resources by setting up 
SOCs to mobilise oil and gas resources in countries as it is feared that private sector 
participants are likely to exploit oil resources. This usually involves nationalisation of oil 
resources and there is an underlying distaste for nationalisation policies from donor 
countries USA, EU for example. Consequently the World Bankdiscourages the 
nationalisation of private companies and ties LDCs to bilateral trade and investment 
agreements to enforce this. 
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In the 1980’s World Bank associates would travel to developing countries offer them 
loans for infrastructure projects that weretoo ambitious and consequently LDCs could 
not pay back (Perkins 2004). Therefore, in order for LDCs to access future loans from 
the IMF they had to adhere to certain policy conditions. LDCs were promoted to sign 
bilateral trade agreements with individual western nations that supported the 
Washington consensus and by LDCs (Perkins, 2004).Lessons from the Washington 
Consensus have made national governments of sub-Saharan Africa aware of the 
structures and institutions that have to be in place to get the maximum economic benefit 
from public private partnerships. The critiques of the theoretical constructs of the policy 
paradigm of free trade economics have been well documented within heterodox 
economics and are available to policy makers of sub Saharan African countries that 
seek them out (Amsden 2007; Chang, 1999; Fine, 2006). Perhaps there is need for a 
more direct influence and Keynesian stance by RMC governments to develop the liquid 
fuel industry in SADC.Rodney (1973) puts it perfectly:  
“Aslong as foreigners own land, mines, factories, banks, insurance companies, means 
of transportation, newspapers, power stations, etc. then for so long will the wealth of 
Africa flow outwards into the hands of those. In other words, in the absence of direct 
political control; foreign investment ensures that the natural resources and the labour of 
Africa produce economic value which is lost to the continent (Rodney, 1973, p. 38).” 
7.2 Policies that can assist Malawi to attract investment 
It is apparent that private sector investment needs to be matched with considerable 
public sector support to ensure that the maximum benefit from the project. The 
Malawian government faces considerable issues and although offtake agreements may 
contribute to swaying private investment there would be a strong need for the public 
sector to engage in the process of implementing policies that will increase the viability of 
a CTL facility. Such policies may include administering the legislative monopoly: 
petroleum importers limited to sign exclusive off-take agreements with the company for 
a few years. Government could also get the public utility ESCOM to also engage in 
secondary off-take agreements to guarantee a secondary revenue stream from a 
secondary power generation capability that could be in cooperated into the facility if 
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motivated by the industry and significant political support. The same coordination could 
be applied by the fertilizer importation institutions to motivate the development of a 
fertilizer complex that would provide a 3rd income stream for the project.  
Secondly, if oil prices remain above or equal to the floor price of CTL produced fuels the 
fuel levy will make conventional fuels less competitive than locally produced fuels. In 
periods where the oil price falls below the price floor government would have to 
guarantee that it will intervene and take the necessary policy measures to protect the 
industry from foreign competition until the industry is at a mature stage. If such a level of 
dedication is implemented by policy makers, there is potential that Malawi could attract 
investor appetite to finance and develop CTL technologies.  
7.3 Malawian Government Policies on Technical Training and R&D 
In order for FDI to be captured to the fullest extent there is need for a strong skills base 
in the economy. Not all learning can occur within private firms. There is therefore a 
strong need for Malawi to increase investment in technical skills through the countries 
technical tertiary institutions. This is a key focus for the country as it forges forward with 
its implementation of Vision 2020. The aim of the Malawian government is to improve 
the quality of its human resource. Vision 2020 placed great stock in the improvement 
and provision of Technical Entrepreneurial Vocational Education and Training (TEVET) 
(Ministry of Education, 2009). Currently the country is in the process of setting up 
technical colleges across the country however the programmes in Malawi have been 
criticised as producing low quality graduates that are not of the quality needed to 
successfully enter the work force. There is a feeling that government has to do more in 
managing the tertiary education system particularly in the technology sector. The 
technical universities are riddled with out dated equipment that cannot develop skilled 
learners. It is paramount that public funds are devoted to this sector in order to 
accelerate the reform programs to increase the technical skills in the education sector 
(Rose, 2010).  
A bigger push by government officials would be needed to align the capabilities of the 
Malawian innovation system to produce graduates with the technical skills that can 
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engage in R&D. A bigger push is needed in the education sector in order for Malawi to 
catch up and develop the skills and firm base required to absorb the skills from FDI.  
7.4 Environmental Issues 
Ghazvinian (2007) in Yates, (2009) sum up environmental concerns perfectly in the 
description of the experience of the Niger Delta: 
‘’Thousands of miles of pipelines crisscross the mangrove creeks of the delta, broken 
up by occasional gas flares that send roaring orange flames into the already hot, humid 
air.  Occasionally oil has been spilled into those creeks, and fishing communities 
disrupted, dislocated or plunged into violent conflict with one another over 
compensation payments.”  
(Ghazvinian (2007) in Yates, (2009)pp.13). 
Malawi’s agricultural, fishing and tourism sectors are significant to the economy and 
play a pivotal role in contributing to the economy. Potential drilling oil in the lake poses 
serious environmental concerns and could be a threat to the livelihood of communities. 
Therefore there is need for a strong regulatory system to ensure that this is approached 
with caution. CTL/GTL also have environmental concerns as they produce twice the 
carbon emissions than that of producing conventional liquid fuels. Consequently to 
make CTL/GTL projects more viable there is need to utilise recent technologies that 
produce the least carbon emissions and also to ensure that the location the plant is 
situated in reservoirs for carbon sequestration. 
7.5 Economic Integration 
SADC comprises of 15 states and there are political complexities in developing 
petroleum sectors. Individual nations often do not have the economies of scale or 
market demand to develop industry, however regionally a case could be built up. Unlike 
the questionable theory of Say’s Law that supply creates its own demand. Individually 
small economies like Malawi, Zambia, Swaziland, and Lesotho do not have the market 
scale to develop individual refining capacity on their own, for example. Therefore, there 
is a strong case for economic integration between nations in SADC that could connect 
the regions resources (Redvers, 2013). Petrochemical industries that are a result of 
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refining activities stand to benefit a lot from economic integration as there would be 
essential economic linkages into other important industries for example agricultural 
sectors (fertilisers)  andmanufacturing (polymers and plastics). 
Economic integration poses some economic threats to local infant industry as local 
producers may find it difficult to compete with industry players from neighbouring 
countries (Redvers, 2013). This may explain Angola’s reluctance to fully join the SADC 
community as competition from member states might wipe out the agricultural infant 
industry it has as it is a net food importer despite historically being self-sufficient. This 
would push Angola further into the path of further dependency on oil, an undeniably 
unfavourable position (Redvers, 2013).  Angola is the primary regional producer of oil 
and is therefore a potential strategic member of SADC. The country’s preference for 
Brazilian and Portuguese food imports goes against its economic integration stance and 
is detrimental for its status in the community (African Development Bank Group, 2013). 
7.6 Resource Curse 
Resource curse theorists have highlighted key causes of concern that impact the growth 
of resource rich economies. Among the main issues are declining terms of trade; the 
price volatility of commodities in international markets; the tendency for multinational 
companies to repatriate profits to their home countries and not invest locally; and the 
effects of Dutch disease.  
The terms of trade argument is centred around the idea that developing nations receive 
too little revenue for their minerals. This is attributable to the economic structures and 
institutions in the global environment. The economic collapse of international commodity 
price agreements in the 1980s as well as global crises that have decreased the demand 
for primary commodities have adversely impacted on the price of commodities and 
therefore revenues of resource rich producing states (Ross, 1999),  affecting the growth 
rates of the economies.  The vulnerability of global commodity prices is also an ailing 
issue for resource rich countries (Rosser, 2004). 
The problem faced by developing countries is that international commodity markets are 
inherently unstable and therefore sharp price declines in commodity prices can have 
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massive effects on the revenues of resource reliant countries as these knock on effects 
could be transferred from the international market to the domestic market. The effect is 
that  foreign exchange reserves are made unreliable, and  private sector investment 
carries high risk  (Ross, 1999).  
Multinational companies have a tendency to repatriate profits from host nations to home 
nations rather than investing them locally. This has implications on industries in 
developing countries as the profits flowing out, if otherwise invested locally into other 
supporting industries could effectively provide profitable valuable forward and backward 
linkages into value chains (Ross,1999). (Rosser, 2006) suggests that FDI provides 
opportunities for well-connected indigenous elites to influence policy via vehicles of their 
preference. South American elites that controlled natural resources in Latin America 
had a vested interest in ISI that prevented the development of a robust competitive 
economy, whereas in east Asia where there was resource poverty such elites did not 
exist hence the development of a competitive export led growth.  
Similar characteristics can be observed in Angola where constitutionally any oil 
company looking to enter the oil industry has to partner up with Sonangol the Angolan 
state company whose CEO is the daughter of president Dos Santos. This economic 
policy can be a beneficial way to govern the resources of the country if the interest of 
the elite are aligned with the interests of the citizens of the country. However more often 
than not this is not the case (Osisa, 2004). (Rosser, 2004) argues that an abundance of 
resources forces countries to integrate into the international capitalist system where the 
needs of developing countries are subordinated to the needs of the of the developed 
world therefore causing an imbalance of interests between the interests of multinational 
companies, political elites and citizens of resource rich nations.  
This imbalance of interest between the marriage of government elites and big business 
versus the interest of the societies they govern arguably influence the development of 
civil war because of inequalities of wealth and limited political involvement, which in turn 
fuel divisions in society based on ethnicity religion and other social identifiers. Angola is 
no stranger to civil war. (Wright &Czulusta, 2004) suggest that countries that are 
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endowed in diamonds or cocoa are likely to suffer longer periods of civil war. Arguably 
because rebel groups will fight for territory that has resources that they can use to 
enrich themselves as well as fund their operations (Wright &Czelusta, 2004). 
Companies in extractive industries can fund these criminal operations and still reap a 
normal profit. Naturally there has to be a buyer of the economic resources for the rebel 
groups to sustain their operations. This is in comparison to companies in a 
manufacturing economy. Companies in a manufacturing economy would not be able to 
operate in an unstable environment and would therefore lack the incentive to engage in 
unscrupulous activities that fuel such activities. Therefore, the enforcement of property 
is essential and some economic players can reap substantial gains in an unruly 
environment.  
Governments are pivotal to any strategy to reap the rewards from their natural 
resources. (Di- John, 2004, pp 2) sums it perfectly: 
 ‘In so far as one general conclusion can be drawn from our collection of empirical 
studies it is that a country's economic performance following a resource boom depends 
to a considerable extent on the policies followed by its government. Even small 
economies have considerable influence over their own economic performance.’  
It is important for governments to take control of the institutional devices they control 
and negotiate preferential terms of trade and develop strategies to develop forward and 
backward linkages into supporting industries.   
7.7 Lessons from Kayelekera Uranium Mine 
In 2007 the Malawian government signed an agreement to partner up with Paladin 
Energy. The agreement offered an opportunity for Malawian government to diversify the 
country’s export base. Investment in the infrastructure was carried out and production 
began. Since then the uranium mining activities have been criticized for several reasons 
ranging from environmental law abuses to a lack of transparency between the entity and 
government officials and tax evasion. It has been apparent that the institutional 
capability of the Malawian government has not been strong enough to regulate the 
entity (Action-Aid, 2015).  
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In order to attract the investment, the Malawian government offered substantial tax 
breaks to Paladin Energy which resulted in the loss of considerable tax revenue. While 
it is well known that multinational companies often engage in transfer pricing tactics to 
avoid the full burden of tax payments, little was done by Malawian authorities to mitigate 
this risk. The lack of regulatory capacity resulted in further tax revenues being lost in the 
system. Financial losses are not the only issues faced by the limited regulatory capacity 
(Action-aid, 2015). Environmental abuses have also been reported and have provided 
negative externalities for surrounding communities. 
Public health issues have been observed in the region. Drivers of the trucks that 
transport the yellow cake have reported experiencing reproduction issues, while  local 
communities have raised concern over pollution of mining waste into the local 
ecosystem (Personal Communication, 2016).  
Following the fall in uranium prices and the nuclear disaster in Japan, events that have 
led to decreased uranium demand, the mining operations were suspended. Had there 
been a local beneficiation strategy in place, there could potentially have been a local 
industry that contributing to domestic demand (Malunga&Phalira, 2014). While the 
country’s economic climate makes the development of such high tier industries 
challenging, local beneficiation and processing of the uranium couldpotentially  
haveprovided linkages into industries such as power production(Malunga et al, 2014).  
The experiencefrom the Kayelekera mine provides some insight into the path the 
negotiation processes ought to follow. A CTL facility would require strong institutional 
capacity to regulate environmental abuses and there would need a strong need to 
enforce local requirements and participation of the local producers.Additionally, 
government needs to ensure tax regulatory authorities are in place to ensure that 
companies do not engage in transfer pricing and other strategies that can be used to 
evade tax. This can only be done with a government to enforce policy and a strong 
regulatory body to ensure operations of the CTL facility are not producing any negative 
externalities (Action-Aid, 2014). 
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8 Policy Recommendations 
Governments that wish to diversify their liquid petroleum sectors through CTL/GTL 
processes, biofuels and the development of infrastructure forintra-regional trade, need 
to take a more active role. The private sector cannot do for a nation what governments 
ought to do and the success of any project depends largely on the strength and 
regulatory capacity of the public sector as well as its ability to coordinate and monitor 
industry dynamics (Mkandawire, 2010; Chang, 2003). 
There is a strong need for economic integration and an investment framework that 
governs pipeline, road, rail and water transport in order to guarantee that investments in 
road transport are not favoured over pipeline, rail or water in the region, for political 
interests. SADC is the organisation that could facilitate this policy cohesion and ensure 
the transport interconnections.This could be done by the development of a regional 
pipeline grid that feeds into RMCs. 
Laws need to be revisited to increase the viability of such projects. Some level of 
protectionist policies will need to remain in place until liquid fuel security needs are met. 
The development of regional pipelinesthat connect major ports and refineries to 
landlocked RMCs could address transportation problems of liquid fuels, as currently it is 
cheaper for Tanzania to source liquid fuels from Gulf/ India via large waterborne tankers 
than by overland tankers from RSA for example.  
Problems within the government itself would have to be addressed. Rent-seeking 
behaviour would have to be reduced and a character of commitment and dedication 
would have to be spread across the government organisations. Additionally, 
government should ensure that government officials are not lobbied by international 
investors and local entrepreneurs to sign agreements that may not be in the public 
interest. The presence of unstable governments could deter investors and also have an 
impact on the development of liquid petroleum projects. 
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9.0 Conclusions 
9.1 Developing Refinery Capacity 
Currently Malawi imports its liquid fuels from ex SADC countries at $53 a barrel. Fuel 
levies account for approximately 34% of the pump price (Malawi Energy Regulatory 
Authority, 2016). The wholesale mark-up is unclear and varies from time to time as are 
transport costs. If a regional pipeline is developed that feeds into Malawi from the main 
ports or refineries, will have a substantial effect on the current pump price of $1.18. 
Therefore in order for Malawi to effectively reduce import prices, the country has to 
integrate and engage in regional or multi-state projects. Existing pipeline infrastructure 
connects the port of Beira to Harare. 
The Beira Harare pipeline has the capacity to transport 6 million litres of petroleum a 
day (Nyarota, 2016). There are reports that the Zimbabwean government is looking to 
increase this capacity to about 16.7 million litres (Nyarota, 2016). The Malawian 
government could engage Zimbabwean authorities to jointly develop this pipeline and 
provide it with a link to Mwanza or Zalewa districts in Malawi (distance of approximately 
512km). Alternatively if the AZOP pipeline picks up Malawi could develop a link to 
Zambia but that would be a longer distance (approximately 710 km).Both of the 
aforementioned pipelines could be linked to the to the Nacala port. A third alternative 
could be a Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Congo pipeline.Figure 18 shows the 
proposed pipelines routes.  
The aforementioned pipeline routes could be viable routes to develop pipeline 
infrastructure however require further enquiry in terms of scale and market 
capitalisation. It is important for countries to integrate infrastructural projects regionally 
because if not delinked infrastructure and unnecessary over capacity could occur (as is 
currently happening in the EAC where Uganda Kenya Ethiopia and South Sudan are 
failing to agree on a single pipeline route to benefit all of them). 
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FIGURE 18: PROPOSED PIPELINE GRID 
Source: SADC, (n.d) 
Therefore in the interim Malawi would do well to utilise rail and water transport 
resources that are provided by the central Nacala corridor, southern Sena corridor and 
the northern Mbeya corridor to transport liquid petroleum. 
A regional pipeline grid anchored to the regions petroleum resources would help ease 
the constraints RMCs currently have. These constraints contribute to the reason this is 
the reason why the region’s refineries import crude from other countries (Gulf) despite 
being abundant in oil. Angolan oil cannot be transported competitively to the region’s 
refineries therefore when a tanker fills up with Cabinda crude it could go anywhere to 
the highest bidder, mainly the Peoples Republic of China and the United States of 
America. Thereforea low cost multi-purpose pipeline grid that connects Angolan crude 
oil and product to other RMC refineries and storage facilities could be a game changer 
for SADC.  
Pipeline infrastructure is the cheapest mode of transport for liquid fuels and would solve 
many transport issues. However, it has high scale economies (pipelines need large 
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volumes to justify high the capex) and would require regional integration as this would 
have to be a multi-state investment. Therefore SADC RMCs must look at the 
establishment of a multiple purpose regional pipeline to transport different petroleum 
products throughout the region at competitive rates. The current pipeline infrastructure 
is inadequate to serve the region. 
 Aside from the aforementioned TANZAM pipeline and Harare and Beira pipeline there 
is further capacity connecting the ports of Richards Bay and Durban to Gauteng. Figure 
19shows the arrangement of the current pipeline grid and the gas link from the Pande-
Temane fields to Secunda. 
 
FIGURE 19: SOUTHERN AFRICA PIPELINE GRID (EXCLUDING THE TANZAM PIPELINE) 
Source: Countries of the world Pipelines, (n.d) 
The development of a regional pipeline grid could provide a basis for the potential 
development of a refinery in future. The low cost solution a pipeline would provide and 
regional scale would further increase the viability of such a project. RMCs would have to 
agree on the tariffs per barrel and coordinate investment accordingly. 
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9.2 CTL/GTL 
CTL/GTL Technologies are uneconomical at low oil prices (roughly 40-50 $/bbl). 
Consequently they have to be heavily subsidised during periods of low oil prices, below 
$40-$50/bbl., and may require government offtake agreements. One of the main 
advantages of CTL technologies is that they produce petrochemicals that can be fed 
into other industries including fertiliser production. The linkages into other industries 
provide valuable industrial opportunities for domestic producers if national governments 
align them in the development of this industry. 
The limited size of the Malawian Market make a modular CTL plant more suitable for 
the country liquid fuel needs. Mott McDonald have been looking at the Liwonde as a 
prime destination for the development of a CTL refinery. Part of their motivating reasons 
are the district’s rail and water connections that can potentially be used to transport 
product out of the plant or transport raw materials (coal) to the plant. Therefore if Malawi 
is to import this technology the country would need to consider a modular facility that 
can later be upsized to suit growing industry needs. The initial investment cost would be 
between $600 000 to $1.3 billion at phase 1. 
The capacity of this plant would be about 3.5k bbl/d of fuel per day which would give an 
annual equivalent of 200 000 000 litres of petroleum (Mott McDonald in Malawi Ministry 
of Trade and industry, 2014). Phase 2 would be to be develop a fertiliser plant to utilise 
the bi-products of the plant bringing the total financial investment to about $1.75 billion. 
In order to increase viability government would have to guarantee a price floor of about 
$65 a barrel on crude oil pricing and award the company import parity pricing models for 
about 5 to 6 years to allow the company to recoup their investment from liquid 
petroleum sales (assuming they sell all petroleum products produced)(Mott McDonald in 
Malawi Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2014). 
Regionally a CTL facility could be potentially be developed in Moatize. The Moatize 
region is an economically viable location for a CTL facility as there are proven coal 
reserves and there is currently considerable coal mining activity, primarily for coking 
coal. It is therefore a region for interested stakeholders to consider, as steam coal  costs 
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could be low, as they would be a “discard” from the open-cast coking coal mining (in the 
overburden). Therefore the plant operators could likely procure the coal for less than 
$10 a ton. There would be negligible transport costs as the plant could be located at the 
mine. This regional plant could also produce the bi-products of refinery processes. A 
regional coking plant could both satisfy the region’s coke imports and supply the by-
product volatiles to a petro-chemicals (F-T) plant as additional feedstock. Therefore, a 
combination of a coal generation plant and coking plant could also be looked at.  
Natural gas resources can also be fed into GTL processes, therefore there is potential 
for a regional GTL facility in Palma. Like the CTL facility in order for a GTL facility to be 
viable it has to have significant regional support in terms of RMC offtake agreements 
not only in the petroleum products produced but also in the bi-products produced. 
Investment in GTL refinery plants are likely to have more of a significant impact on the 
Mozambican economy than by developing gas trains for the export of LNG as the export 
of LNG is more likely to lead to Dutch-disease: skills diversion to the LNG gas industry 
and limited diversification of the economy. It is therefore important for Mozambican 
authorities in conjunction with SADC heads of state to develop a common policy 
framework to govern the development of feedstocks for petroleum products. 
9.3 Biofuels 
Biofuels are relatively underdeveloped in Malawi. There is a need for the harmonisation 
of policy in the agricultural, energy and petroleum sectors. This harmonisation of policy 
and public sector guidance could provide incentives for private sector participants, for 
example Illovo, to expand their production of biofuels and agricultural output to aid the 
biofuel (ethanol) industry. This PPP mode of production would be efficient in growing 
and diversifying the liquid petroleum industry. 
An advanced biofuels plant that has the capacity to produce 200 million litres of fuel per 
annumwould cost approximately $150 million. This would substitute a significant portion 
of liquid fuels almost half of Malawi’s requirement. Substantial state support in the form 
of a floor-price would be needed to make this investment viable. Offtake agreements 
and import parity pricing could provide incentives for the private sector companies like 
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Illovo to invest in added capacity to produce more caneand ethanolfor biofuel 
feedstocks. A 200 million litre per annum capacity plant would need approximately 4-5 
years of import parity pricing support for the investment to be financially viable. 
Biodiesel production from oil seeds (Table 3) could further provide seed cake that can 
be fed into animal feed production.  
Decentralised modes of biofuel production currently exist within small farming 
communities in rural Malawi. Farmers utilisesmall-scale technologies that convert oil 
seeds and used cooking oil to biodiesel. This mode of production has a low investment 
value and is currently utilised by individuals and small farming communities. Therefore 
this production never enters the market (to attract taxes) making it more competitive for 
farming communities to utilise this form of production to power tractors and other 
agricultural machinery. The Malawian government has to increase its footprint in this 
sector and support the development of these technologies through universities and 
other research institutions as well as offering direct financial support. 
Therefore nations that are looking to diversify their liquid fuels industries 
throughCTL/GTLtechnologies, biofuels and thedevelopment of import 
infrastructureshould consider developing a synergy that combines the aforementioned 
sources. There are environmental advantages that biofuel technologies have over 
CTL/GTL technologiesand that CTL/GTL processes have over liquid fuels imports like 
the production of petrochemicals that feed into other industries. Therefore a RMCs need 
to develop energy policies that harmonise all of the aforementioned energy sources. It is 
important for RMCs to integrate their feedstocks infrastructure so that they can mobilise 
the resources that are available in the region.  
One way to develop regional resources is to review licensing conditions and put in 
minimum value addition requirements on minerals that foreign MNCs have to adhere to. 
Some of the areas that could be addressed by this policyare local content requirements, 
minimum processing of the minerals and competitive prices to downstream 
beneficiaries, the upgrading of indigenous infrastructure and capital as well as 
implementing a tax policy that will ensure RMCs get a share of the rents of the growing 
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mining activity in the region. Control mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that 
individual RMCs abide by the policy agreements that SADC states collectively agree 
upon. 
Within the right policy environment both, national and regionally, RMCs could effectively 
implement biofuels, CTL/GTL technologies as well as upgrade and integrate 
infrastructure. Presently imports are the cheapest option but there is no guarantee that 
this will be the case in the medium and long term. Therefore RMCs must consider other 
non-conventional modes that are best suited to the needs of their respective economies 
with the end goal of supplying the region.  
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